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ABSTRACT
The extension of anti-money laundering (AML) controls to
lawyers has been an object of controversy since the early 2000s.
Facing these measures, the legal profession has adopted different
strategies of response, three examples of which are examined and
contrasted in this Article. In the United States, the legal profession
vocally objected to the measures and has been able to deflect any
legislative action. In the United Kingdom, the profession actively
engaged with ambitious new rules, while in France, the legal
profession made maximum use of the levers of self-regulation allowed
by the European directives. This Article presents AML lawyerregulation as an example of the versatility of global regulatory norms
which do not necessarily evict national traditions. It also presents the
European Union as the bedrock of AML regulatory diffusion and
critiques US professional resistance to these norms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
International standards of anti-money laundering (“AML”)
regulation involve placing control mechanisms at different access
points into the international financial system.1 The inclusion of the
legal profession into this regulatory regime in the early 2000s led to the
imposition in various countries of obligations on lawyers that were
modelled on those of financial institutions. Because they collided with
traditional models of lawyer regulation and professional conduct, these
obligations provoked a decades-long confrontation between
lawmakers, courts, and legal professionals that played out in many
countries. National legal professions implemented different strategies
to deal with the new AML standards, leading to outcomes marked by
the circumstances of each country and extent of domestic influence
wielded by its legal profession.
This Article will not analyze the substance of the AML standards
in detail, or their theoretical justification, as they have amply been
described elsewhere. Rather, the objective here is to compare and
contrast the strategies that were adopted in specific countries by
national legal professions, the diversity of resulting outcomes, and the
empirical response that can be identified in countries where hard-law
rules were introduced. In other words, this is an account of the
resistance strategies deployed by lawyers and their professional
organizations against obligations initially perceived by them to be
excessive, imposed from the outside, or contrary to traditional
standards of professional conduct and culture.

1. GILMORE, DIRTY MONEY: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL MEASURES TO
COUNTER MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 95-97 (2010) (citing a
FATF report of February 1990 emphasizing the need for detection at entry points); Peter
Alldridge, Money Laundering and Globalization, 35 J. L. & SOC’Y 437, 442 (2008)(explaining
that in addition to prohibition (i.e. criminalization), AML involves preventative measures such
as “regulation of markets and imposition of reporting obligations”).
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This Article proceeds by way of case studies selected to highlight
salient differences. The first case study is that of the United States. In
the United States, AML lawyer-related standards are referred to as the
“Gatekeeper Initiative,” a designation which is not neutral and reflects
the profession’s continuing opposition to these measures.2 The US
legal profession has to this day successfully deflected any mandatory
introduction of AML standards, putting forward instead diluted
voluntary measures under the control of its self-governance bodies,
rather than external regulators.3 The US strategy has been successful
mainly because of the significant resources, organization, influence
wielded by lawyers in American society in general, and influence by
the American Bar Association (“ABA”) in particular. At the other end
of the spectrum are two case studies drawn from the European Union,
where prospects of hard-law AML standards materialized early on. The
European legal profession was collectively unable to counter the
legislative tide; after unsuccessful court challenges by some of the
national professions, binding measures were eventually imposed on
all.4 These professions have dealt since then with their AML
obligations through differentiated strategies, which reveal a divide
between the British profession, which has very actively engaged in
AML procedures including suspicious transaction reporting, and
Continental countries where suspicious transaction reporting is
scarcer.5 The United Kingdom will accordingly be used as a second
case study, followed by France as an example of a Continental
response.6 The last section of this Article will attempt to draw out wider
lessons from these differentiated strategies.
A final word of introduction is to mention the particular case of
Canada. In contrast to the United States, but similar to the European
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part V.
5. See infra Parts IV and V.
6. For a comparative study by economists of the responses in the UK and Sweden, see
Karin Svedberg Helgesson & Ulrika Mörth, Involuntary Public Policy-making by For-Profit
Professionals: European Lawyers on Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, 54 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 1216 (2016). See also Nathaniel Tilahun Ali, States’ Varied Compliance
with International Money Laundering Standards for Legal Professionals, 88 NORDIC J. INT’L
L. 280, 280 (2019) (concluding that the varied national responses to the AML duties of lawyers
reflect not national commitment to the rule of law but differences “in the philosophical
inclinations of judiciaries over how the legal profession serves the public interest” and “a turf
war over the administration of the legal profession”).
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Union, Canadian legislators were at the forefront of AML regulation
and able to push through legislation imposing AML obligations onto
Canadian lawyers in 2001.7 The mandatory reporting obligation was,
however, countermanded by the courts as contrary to Canadian
constitutional principles.8 Therefore, it seems that the Canadian legal
profession was unable to block legislation, but successful in achieving
protection by the courts against suspicious transaction reporting,9
something the European profession was not able to achieve. Canada
would be an interesting fourth case study for this Article, but will be
set aside in the interest of brevity.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AML LAWYER-RELATED
REGULATORY REGIME
While this Article does not analyze the substance of the AML
lawyer-related regime, it is necessary nevertheless to say a few
introductory words to place it in historical perspective. As is wellknown, the body in charge of producing global AML norms since 1989
has been the Financial Action Task Force, (“FATF”), an
intergovernmental body headquartered in Paris and lodged by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”).
The initial objective of the global AML regimes produced in the 1980s
and 1990s was to combat the laundering of proceeds of drug trafficking
by measures primarily applicable to the banking sector.10 It soon
became apparent, however, that criminal organizations were turning to
7. See MICHELLE M. GALLANT, LAWYERS AND MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATION:
TESTING THE LIMITS OF THE SECRECY IN CANADA 1 (2013); Ronald J. MacDonald, Money
Laundering Regulation – What Can be Learned from the Canadian Experience, 2010 J. PROF.
LAW. 143, 144 (2010).
8. Canada (A.G.) v. Federation of Law Societies, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 401 (Can.).
9. On the debates that occurred at the time, see generally GALLANT, supra note 7;
MacDonald, supra note 7.
10. The FATF Recommendations: International Standards on Combating Money
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF]
(June
2019),
www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.p
df [https://perma.cc/CAX9-RADJ] [hereinafter FATF 2012 Recommendations]. The original
recommendations produced by the FATF in 1990 were entitled the “Forty Recommendations.”
The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force On Money Laundering, FATF
(1990),
https://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%201990.p
df [https://perma.cc/V69W-3AL3].
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more sophisticated methods to launder gains, and that these methods
involved the creation of legal entities and new categories of external
service providers, such as lawyers and accountants.11 The idea of
including these professions into the AML regulatory regime was first
mooted at the political level by a G8 summit held in 1999 in Moscow.12
At that meeting, the heads of government decided collectively to
“consider requiring or enhancing suspicious transaction reporting by
the ‘gatekeepers’ to the international financial system, including
company formation agents, accountants, auditors and lawyers, as well
as making the intentional failure to file the reports a punishable offense,
as appropriate.”13 This was the first clear signal that lawyers were on
the political radar screen. They were being bundled together with other
services categories, a fact that would cause lawyer consternation,14 but
in 1999 the G8 was merely committing to consider the measures. It
used the expression “gatekeepers,” which was later somewhat
discarded in actual AML regulatory production, except in the United
States where it took on a powerful symbolic dimension, as will be
argued in this Article. In July 2000, a G7 Meeting of Finance Ministers
specifically tasked the FATF to revise its recommendations to include
the gatekeepers.15
The next and most dramatic milestone were the September 11
attacks and EU adoption of the Second Directive on December 4,
11. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 45-46; Patricia Shaughnessy, The New EU Anti-Money
Laundering Directive: Lawyers as Gatekeepers and Whistle-Blowers, 34 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS.
25, 26-27 (2002).
12. Ministerial Conference of the G-8 Countries on Combating Transnational Organized
Crime - Communique, FED. AM. SCIENTISTS ¶ 32 (Oct. 20, 1999),
https://fas.org/irp/news/1999/10/991020-crime-rus.htm [https://perma.cc/RS9B-DA77].
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Int’l Bar Ass’n et al., A Lawyer’s Guide to Detecting and Preventing Money
Laundering,
A M.
BAR
ASS’N
5
(Oct.
2014),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2014oct_abaguide_preventi
ngmoneylaundering.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SK9-L328].
15. The G7 report states as follows:
We take note that, as a follow-up to the October 1999 Moscow Ministerial Conference
on Combating Transnational Organized Crime, an experts group was convened to
study the issues related to the involvement of professionals such as lawyers and
accountants (“gatekeepers” to the international financial system) in money
laundering. We express our support for the continuation of this work.
Report from G7 Finance Ministers to the Heads of State and Government, Actions Against
Abuse of the Global Financial System, G7 INFO. CTR. ¶ B.5(a) (July 21, 2000),
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2000okinawa/abuse.htm
[https://perma.cc/4LP5-N8Q8];
see GILMORE, supra note 1, at 106 (2010).
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2001.16 The directive had been under discussion for several years, yet
one of the areas of disagreement was precisely the inclusion of the legal
professions.17 Commentators report that the European Commission
was heavily influenced by the FATF,18 and that the Commission
wanted to include the legal profession into the regime but the European
Parliament was in favor of broader exemptions.19 Ultimately the
Commission’s position prevailed and the Second Directive became the
first fully documented and legally binding expression of the new
regulatory standards that would become applicable to lawyers.20 It has
since been followed by the Third,21 Fourth,22 Fifth, and Sixth
Directives,23 all including identical or quasi-identical language
regarding lawyers. It can therefore be argued that contrary to frequent
commentary, the European directives are the real regulatory
benchmark against which the standards issued by the FATF or in other
national regimes should be compared. The Second Directive lawyer
16. Shaughnessy, supra note 11, at 30-32.
17. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 230-31.
18. Id.
19. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 230 (citing VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS, MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNTER-MEASURES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Kluwer Law Int’l ed., 2013)). The Council
was apparently aligned more with the Commission than the Parliament. See also the Opinion of
the European Court of Justice Advocate General Miguel Poiares Maduro of 14 December 2006
on Case C-305/05, Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et Germanophone v. Conseil des
Ministres, E.C.R. I-5308, ¶¶ 10-16, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/FR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62005CC0305&from=CS [https://perma.cc/N5V4-4H7G]
[hereinafter Opinion of Miguel Poiares Maduro]. See also Shaughnessy, supra note 11, at 3032.
20. See Directive 2001/97, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 76 (EU) [hereinafter Second Directive]. The
language extending the AML regime to lawyers is at Article 2 introducing a new Article 2(a)5
into the historical First Directive 91/308/EEC of 1991.
21. Directive 2005/60, 2005 O.J. (L 309) 15. On the preventive use of the financial system
for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, see id. at 3 (entirely replacing the
First and Second Directives) [hereinafter Third Directive]. Its main effects were to widen the
definition of predicate offenses for money laundering, implement the principle of “risk-based”
CDD and introduce the prohibition against tipping-off in connection with suspicious transaction
reporting.
22. Directive 2015/849, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 73 (entirely replacing the Third Directive and
entering into force on 26 June 2017) [hereinafter Fourth Directive]. Amongst its novelties was
the enhancement of CDD obligations, in particularly in connection with PEPs, and introduction
of mandatory beneficial ownership registers of EU companies.
23. See Directive 2018/843, 2018 O.J. (L 156) (amending the Fourth Directive and due to
be implemented by 10 January 2020) [hereinafter Fifth Directive]. See also Directive 2018/1673,
2018 O.J. (L 284) 22, (adopted a few months after the Fifth Directive in order to expand and
unify criminal law and tax evasion) [hereinafter Sixth Directive]. Generally, no major changes
have been made to the lawyer-related provisions since the Second and Third Directives.
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provisions
actually
pre-dated
the
corresponding
FATF
recommendations that were produced in 2003, with the revision of their
historical “Forty Recommendations,”24 including Recommendation 12
mandating inclusion of lawyers into the AML customer due diligence
and record keeping regimes for certain types of activities and
Recommendation 16 requiring lawyers to report suspicious
transactions.25 The FATF is undoubtedly an influential body that has
widened the geographical diffusion of AML standards and maintains
its influence through a recurring peer review process. However, when
one is dealing in regulatory regimes and examining the conduct of reallife legal professions, reality is defined more by hard-law provisions
that are legally binding than by proposed recommendations, and this is
why EU law seems like the more relevant benchmark.
As will be briefly set out in the following paragraphs, the
provisions affecting lawyers in the European Union and FATF regimes
comprise three main limbs. The first limb is the typology of covered
activities that fall under AML obligations in the first place, when
conducted by lawyers. The second limb regards the obligation to
properly identify clients of covered activities and maintain records: this
is often referred to as “client due diligence” (“CDD”), or “Know your
Client” (“KYC”). The third limb is the mandatory reporting of
suspicious transactions, subject to the respect of traditional rules
regarding professional secrecy and legal privilege. This is usually
referred to as “suspicious transaction reporting” (“STRs”) or
24. The original Forty Recommendations of 1990 (supra note 10) and a first set of
revisions adopted in 1996 did not extend AML procedures to lawyers (for a copy of these
documents, see GILMORE, supra note 1, at 269-84). The 1996 revisions recommended only that
appropriate national authorities “consider applying Recommendations 10 to 21 and 23 to the
conduct of financial activities as a commercial undertaking by businesses or professions which
are not financial institutions.” (¶ 9). In its 2000-2001 Annual Report, FATF then wrote that “one
solution offered by the experts this year is to encourage including [the legal] professions under
the same anti-money laundering obligations as financial intermediaries when they perform
similar functions” (¶ 80), and that its “working group will carefully analyse whether the FATF
Forty Recommendations should be extended to cover certain categories of nonfinancial
businesses and professions, and other financial intermediaries” (¶ 86(c)). Evidently this language
was still tentative and not definitive. See Annual Report 2000-2001, FATF (June 22, 2001),
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2000%202001%20ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M8H6-9MTT].
25. The two Recommendations are now renumbered in the FATF 2012 Recommendations
as Recommendations 22 and 23. The inclusion of these Recommendations in 2003 was
facilitated by the Second Directive equivalents which had been adopted a few months earlier.
See GILMORE, supra note 1, at 112).
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“suspicious activity reporting” (“SARs”).26 Of these three limbs, the
third has been the most controversial.27
The current European language regarding the first limb of lawyer
AML obligations is found in the Fourth Directive.28 According to its
provisions, lawyers (or more precisely, “notaries and other
independent legal professionals”) are “obliged entities” placed under
AML obligations similar to banks or other financial institutions
where they participate, whether by acting on behalf of and for their
client in any financial or real estate transaction, or by assisting in
the planning or carrying out of transactions for their client
concerning the:
(i) Buy and selling of real property or business entities;
(ii) managing of client money, securities or other assets;
(iii) opening or management of bank, savings or securities
accounts;
(iv) organization of contributions necessary for the creation,
operation or management of companies;
(v) creation, operation or management of trusts, companies,
foundations, or similar structures; [ . . . ].29

In the FATF regime, this broadly corresponds to Recommendation 12
of the 2003 Recommendations and Recommendation 22(d) of the
currently applicable 2012 Recommendations as last updated in June
2019.
The second limb of the AML lawyer regime is the obligation for
lawyers conducting these covered activities to properly identify their
clients and maintain adequate documentation (CDD or KYC).30 This
limb has given rise to much less controversy. In many countries, it has
been seen as promoting good practices even outside of AML
considerations.31 The third and final limb, the most controversial of the
26. One should also add its corollary, the prohibition against tipping-off, which was added
to the European system by the Third Directive.
27. See infra Part III regarding the United States and Part V regarding the French reaction.
28. This language is almost identical to the original definition introduced by the Second
Directive in 2001.
29. See Fourth Directive, supra note 22, art. 2(1)(3)(b) (originally in Article 2 of the
Second Directive, supra note 20).
30. Fourth Directive, supra note 22, ch. II; FATF 2012 Recommendations, supra note 10,
Recommendations 10, 11, 17, 18 and 19.
31. Most professional conduct rules requiring that lawyers properly identify their client as
a necessary pre-condition to providing adequate representation.
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three, is the obligation to report suspicious transactions and the
prohibition on informing the client that a report has been made, a rule
known as “no tipping off.” The reporting obligation is set out in the
following terms in the Fourth Directive (in terms almost identical to the
original 2001 language of the Second Directive):
Member States shall require obliged entities, and, where
applicable, their directors and employees, to cooperate fully by
promptly:
(a) informing the FIU, including by filing a report, on their own
initiative, where the obliged entity knows, suspects or has
reasonable grounds to suspect that funds, regardless of the
amount involved, are the proceeds of criminal activity or are
related to terrorist financing, and by promptly responding to
requests by the FIU for additional information in such cases;
and
(b) providing the FIU, directly or indirectly, at its request, with all
necessary information, in accordance with the procedures
established by the applicable law.
All suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, shall
be reported.32

Recognition is given, however, to the specific circumstances of
the legal profession.33 This is done through two mechanisms: first,
reporting can be conducted not directly, but through national bar
authorities, and second, reporting is never required for certain types of
activity:
By way of derogation [ . . . ], Member States may, in the case of
[notaries and other independent legal professionals], designate an

32. Fourth Directive, supra note 22, art. 33(1). The equivalent is at Recommendation 23(a)
of the FATF 2012 Recommendations: “Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals
and accountants should be required to report suspicious transactions when, on behalf of or for a
client, they engage in a financial transaction in relation to the activities described in paragraph
(d) of Recommendation 22.” Reporting persons are then prohibited from disclosing the fact of
that report to their client or any third person, a rule known as “no tipping off” (Article 39 of the
Fourth Directive and Recommendation 21 of the FATF 2012 Recommendations applicable to
lawyers as a consequence of Recommendation 23).
33. Id. See also the Interpretative Note to Recommendation 23 of the FATF 2012
Recommendations, at 85 (“Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, and
accountants acting as independent legal professionals, are not required to report their suspicions
if the relevant information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject to professional
secrecy or legal professional privilege”).

330

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:2

appropriate self-regulatory body of the profession concerned as the
authority to receive the information [ . . . ]. [ . . . ] [T]he designated
self-regulatory body shall [ . . . ] forward the information to the
FIU promptly and unfiltered;34

and
Member States shall not apply the [reporting] obligations [ . . . ] to
notaries [or] other independent legal professionals, [ . . . ] to the
strict extent that such exemption relates to information that they
receive from, or obtain on, one of their clients, in the course of
ascertaining the legal position of their client, or performing their
task of defending or representing that client in, or concerning,
judicial proceedings, including providing advice on instituting or
avoiding such proceedings, whether such information is received
or obtained before, during or after such proceedings.35

The intention of EU lawmakers was clearly to exempt traditional
lawyering activities from the reporting obligation. This is consistent
with the fact that court and contentious activities are not included in
“covered activities,” i.e. lawyers engaged in that kind of work are not
“obliged entities” subject to AML obligations in the first place. Instead
of referring back to domestic legislation or law, EU lawmakers
preferred to craft their own vocabulary to describe these exemptions.
For instance, they refer not to “legal advice,” but to “ascertaining the
legal position of clients.” In the national instruments transposing the
directives into each of the member states, however, the language tends
to circle back to pre-existing and better-defined legal concepts such as
“legal advice,”36 legal “privilege,”37 or “professional secrecy.”38
These legal categories in the European Directives closely reflect
the soft-law standards of the FATF. As has already been stated, there
has been substantial alignment throughout the years between the
normative AML production of the European Union and the
34. Fourth Directive, supra note 22, art. 34(1).
35. Fourth Directive, supra note 22, art. 34(2) (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., the expression “legal advice” (consultation juridique) used in the French
statutory transposition of the Directives at Article L 561.3 of the Monetary and Financial Code
(CMF). C. MON. ET FIN. [MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CODE] art. L 561.3 (Fr.).
37. See, e.g., the expression “privileged circumstances” used at Section 330 of the British
Proceeds of Crime Act (infra note 94).
38. See, e.g, the concept of “professional secrecy” (secret professionnel) repeatedly used
in the successive AML-related professional regulations produced by the French Conseil National
des Barreaux (infra notes 157 and 166).
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recommendations of the FATF. The key difference being, however,
that norms produced by the European Union are not “soft-law,” but
legally binding on the member states.
III. THE UNITED STATES: KEEPING FEDERAL LAWMAKERS
OUT
The US legal profession is organized into 50 separate state bars
and represented at the national level by the American Bar Association
(“ABA”), a voluntary association of lawyers across the country.39
Whether the profession is “self-regulated” or regulated principally by
the judiciary has been the object of debate and is not directly relevant
for this Article.40 What is more important is the national role that is
played by the ABA, particularly in the production of benchmark
standards of professional conduct for the profession,41 the exclusion of
federal or state lawmakers from primary responsibility for the
regulatory oversight of lawyers or production of rules of conduct, and
the profession’s desire to protect this traditional division of tasks.
Instances of federal involvement in lawyer regulation do exist,
however. One example is in connection with the work of securities
lawyers.42 In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals in the
39. See The American Bar Association, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
https://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/ [https://perma.cc/TKZ4-5RD2] (last visited Nov.
30, 2019). According to the ABA website, the ABA was founded in 1878. Its mission is “to
serve [its] members,” “advocate for the profession,” “eliminate bias and enhance diversity” and
“advance the rule of law.”
40. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)
(stating that “[t]he legal profession is largely self-governing”); Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of
Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1148-49 (2009) (pointing out that “courts,
commentators, and legal ethics regulators continue to conceptualize law as a “self-regulated
profession”); Laurel S. Terry, The Power of Lawyer Regulators to Increase Client & Public
Protection Through Adoption of a Proactive Regulation System , 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
717, 721 (2016) (indicating that “the state supreme courts typically have the overarching
responsibility for lawyer regulation . . . .”).
41. Those currently in place are the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which
were transposed, with variations, in the 50 fifty individual states via the state judiciaries MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 40, pmbl. ¶ 10.
42. The practices of US tax lawyers are also subject to certain regulations by the IRS. See
William H. Simon, Introduction: The Post-Enron Identity Crisis of the Business Lawyer, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 947, 950 (2005). Other areas of lawyer activity where lawmakers or
regulators have introduced rules that affect their conduct are banking, bankruptcy, class actions,
criminal defense, debt collection, or insurance defense. On this “fragmentation” of lawyer
regulation and rules of conduct, see John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV.
959, 961 (2009).
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early 2000s, federal lawmakers instructed the Securities Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) to issue guidelines on lawyer conduct when
clients commit material violations of the securities laws.43 These rules,
which were reflected in Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
Part 205 Rules of the SEC, were fiercely resisted by the profession at
the time.44 It so happens that the debate on Section 307 and Part 205
raged exactly at the same time the FATF was preparing to roll out its
2003 Recommendations including the duties of lawyers. This Article
will return to the possible effects of this coincidental timing later.
At present, US lawyers are in the fairly unique position of not
facing any mandatory regulatory requirements in connection with
AML policy. This was made possible by the ABA’s active resistance
from the very inception of what they immediately named the
“Gatekeeper Initiative,” channeled through a specially formed “Task
Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession.”45 The only
measure that has been accepted by the US legal profession to date are
“Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and
Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing” that were issued
by the ABA in 2010.46 These measures replicate to a certain extent the
detailed “risk-based” client due diligence measures recommended by
the FATF and introduced in the EU by the Third Directive,47 but they
are only voluntary. The ABA’s “Voluntary Good Practices” document
pointedly indicates that
[i]t is not intended to be, nor should it be construed as, a statement
of the standard of care governing the activities of lawyers in
implementing a risk-based approach to combat money laundering
and terrorist financing. Rather, given the vast differences in
practices, firms, and lawyers throughout the United States, [it]

43. Leubsdorf, supra note 42, at 1017-18; JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 217 (2006).
44. Id.
45. Task Force On Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession, AM. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/gatekeeper/
[https://perma.cc/NZ3JGRMM] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
46. ABA, Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing, AM. BAR ASS’N (Apr. 23, 2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2010_am_116.pdf
[hereinafter ABA Voluntary Good Practices]; ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 463 (2013) (endorsing the Voluntary Good Practices).
47. Directive 2005/60, supra note 21, at 15-16.
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seeks only to serve as a resource that lawyers can use in developing
their own voluntary risk-based approaches.48

Because of the absence of any binding legal obligation on lawyers
(and other service professions), the United States has been rated “noncompliant” in the relevant sections of the “Mutual Evaluations”
conducted in 200649 and 201650 under the auspices of the FATF.
According to the latest 2016 Mutual Evaluation report, the United
States “regulatory framework has some significant gaps, including
minimal coverage of certain institutions and businesses (investment
advisers (IAs), lawyers, accountants, real estate agents, trust and
company service providers (other than trust companies).” 51 To this it
adds that “ . . . the vulnerability of these minimally covered [ . . . ]
sectors is significant, considering the many examples identified by the
national risk assessment process.”52
This is not to say, however, that the United States is not doing
anything at all, or that the international critique of the US framework
has been entirely without effect. A few high-profile scandals likely
helped to push some US governmental action. For example, the
Panama Papers data leak and a 60 Minutes television program, which
filmed several New York attorneys discussing techniques to conceal
ultimate ownership of real estate before an NGO representative who
was posing as the lawyer of a foreign official.53 Following these
48. ABA Voluntary Good Practices, supra note 46, at 3.
49. Summary of the Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and
Combating the Financing of Terrorism, United States of America, FATF-GAFI 13-14 (June 23,
2006), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20US%20ES.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8APJ-VY79].
50. FATF on Money Laundering & Asian/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, United
States
Mutual
Evaluation
Report,
AM. BAR ASS’N
3-4
(Dec.
2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/fatf_mutual_evalua
tion_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/95PW-PBSU].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. The Panama Papers, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Aug. 21,
2019), https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/panama-papers-faq-all-you-need-toknow-about-the-2016investigation/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMImK_f_rXq5QIVF5SzCh0zmwFlEAAYASAAEgJXM_D
_BwE [https://perma.cc/9FE6-QRLM]; Undercover Investigation of American Lawyers Reveals
Role of Overseas Territories, in Moving Suspect Money into the United States, GLOBAL
WITNESS (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/undercoverinvestigation-american-lawyers-reveals-role-overseas-territories-moving-suspect-moneyunited-states/ [https://perma.cc/MP26-M4ES].
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scandals, the US FIU Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(“FinCEN”) implemented territorial “targeting orders” imposing that
specialized intermediaries known as real estate “title insurance
companies,” which intervene in real estate acquisitions alongside banks
and lawyers, identify the ultimate beneficial owners in certain types of
transactions.54 US banks have also come under additional AML
obligations introduced by FinCEN in recent years.55 It is notable,
however, that these new AML obligations were placed not on lawyers,
but on other intermediaries or banks. Lawyers have, until now at least,
remained immune.
To understand why this is so, it is necessary to return to the
complex matrix of US lawyer regulation, which is often bewildering to
outsiders because it involves multiple layers of tension and balancing.
The traditional principle of US lawyer self-regulation (or regulation by
the judiciary) must be balanced against the perceived risk of legislative
or executive intervention, the powers of the fifty state bars must be
balanced against the influence of the central organization (the ABA),
and the powers of the states must be balanced against those of the
federal branch. It seems that one of the ABA’s main objectives, when
faced with the FATF standards, was to keep out the federal lawmakers
and executive agencies: these were the points of contact through which
the FATF and other foreign governments or organizations were
perceived to be attempting to exercise influence on US regulatory
design. This fear of federal interference as a result of foreign influence
is very clear from the language of the 2010 “Voluntary Good Practices”
document: it points out that the “government is under pressure from the
FATF and others (including development agencies, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United Nations) to adopt
legislation implementing some or all of the provisions of the [FATF]
Recommendations relating to the legal profession.”56 In this context,
its overarching purpose was to promote voluntary standards that would
54. See, e.g., US Treasury Department, FinCEN Expands Reach of “Geographical
Territorial Orders” Beyond Manhattan and Miami, FINCEN (July 27, 2016),
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-expands-reach-real-estate-geographictargeting-orders-beyond-manhattan [https://perma.cc/MAD6-VE8E].
55. See, e.g., US Treasury Department, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for
Financial Institutions, FINCEN (May 11, 2016), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR2016-05-11/pdf/2016-10567.pdf [https://perma.cc/JEH4-5DTX].
56. ABA Voluntary Good Practices, supra note 46, at 3.
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be sufficiently widely implemented to “negate the need for federal
regulation.”57 In other words, the ABA saw as its main mission not
active participation in global regulatory design, including through the
crafting and dissemination of standards that might be accepted as
mandatory, but to avoid giving the federal government an excuse to
intervene.58
The US legal profession appears to have been fairly unified in its
objection to the introduction of mandatory AML standards. Scholarly
publications discussing the subject are generally critical of the
measures, albeit in varying degrees. 59 The critique is not surprising,
57. Id.
58. This ABA position is also reflected in its long-standing opposition to mandatory
registration of beneficial ownership of US corporations, a policy which it views as indirectly
introducing AML duties on lawyers. In this connection the ABA writes in 2018 that:
“it opposes legislation and regulations that would impose burdensome and intrusive
gatekeeper requirements on lawyers, including bills that would subject the legal
profession to key anti-money laundering compliance provisions of the Bank Secrecy
Act. If adopted, these measures would undermine the attorney-client privilege, the
confidential lawyer-client relationship, and traditional state court regulation of the
legal profession, while also imposing excessive new federal regulations on lawyers
engaged in the practice of law.”
Gatekeepers
Regulations
on
Attorneys,
A M.
BAR
ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_policy/indep
endence_of_the_legal_profession/bank_secrecy_act/ [https://perma.cc/H5UE-DRMP] (last
visited Nov. 30, 2019).
59. Bruce Zagaris, The Gatekeepers Initiative: An Emerging Challenge for Professional
Advisors Of International Business And Tax Matters, AM. BAR ASS’N, 18 (2002),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/
crimjust_taskforce_articles_gatekeepter2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RUF-7Y54]; Bruce Zagaris,
Gatekeepers Initiative – Lawyers and the Bar Ignore it at their Peril, 23 CRIM. JUST. 28, 32
(2008) [hereinafter Zagaris (2008)]; Kevin L. Shepherd, Guardians at the Gate: The Gatekeeper
Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach for Transactional Lawyers, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST.
L. J. 607, 612 (2009); Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Financial Action Task Force and
its 2008 Lawyer Guidance, 2010 JOUR. PROF. L. 3, 9 (2010) (this was a special issue of the
ABA’s Journal of the Professional Lawyer containing other articles on the topic of FATF lawyer
measures) [hereinafter Terry (2010)]; Laurel Terry, U.S. Legal Profession Efforts to Combat
Money Laundering& Terrorist Financing, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 487, 514 (2015)
(commending the U.S. government and the U.S. legal profession for taking the “long view” in
their approach to implementing FATF’s recommendations); Duncan E. Osborne, The Financial
Action Task Force and the Legal Profession, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. REV. 422, 423 (criticizing the role
of the FATF); Laurel S. Terry & José Carlos Llerena Robles, The Relevance of FATF’s
Recommendations and Fourth Round of Mutual Evaluations to the Legal Profession, 42
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 627, 729 (2018) (critical of FATF’s lack of engagement with the legal
profession but supportive of more AML involvement by lawyers, in particular KYC/CDD). But
see Rebecca Gregory, The Lawyer’s Role: Will Uncle Sam Want You in the Fight Against Money
Laundering and Terrorism? 72 UMKC L. REV. 23, 50 (2003) (noting that US professional rules
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admittedly, when expressed by authors who were members of the ABA
Task Force lobbying against the reforms. One member described the
“Gatekeeper Initiative” as “astonishingly broad”60 and creating
“unprecedented challenges to the sanctity of the attorney-client
privilege, the duty of client confidentiality and the delivery of services
generally in the American legal system.”61 In contrast, the work of the
ABA Task Force, presumably the “Guardians at the Gate” of the
article’s title, has been described as “an admirable battle against FATF
and its member states in order to curb the excesses of the Gatekeeper
Initiative.”
To be fair, a portion of the US critique shares commonalities with
some of the critique that initially emanated from the European
professions. For example, it points to the unclear language used by
FATF in its various definitions, the challenge posed by STR/SAR
reporting obligations to traditional lawyer duties of confidentiality, and
the absence of hard empirical data linking voluntary lawyer
participation to money-laundering activity.62 However, where the US
critique seems to stand out is its skepticism vis-à-vis what is presented
as legal transplants from a non-legitimate, non-democratically elected
organization (i.e. FATF). This is most clearly expressed in a 2008
article by another member of an ABA working group:
The FATF process of promulgating and then trying to implement
AML standards for gatekeepers suffers from: (1) exclusion of
major stakeholders from the decision-making process except for
are likely to change). In line with its position on lawyer-related AML in the US, US scholarship
is critical of the European directives regarding lawyers. Shaughnessy, supra note 11, at 44;
Danielle Jasmin Kirby, The European Union’s Gatekeeper Initiative: The European Union
Enlists Lawyers in the Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance, 37 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 261, 261 (2008).
60. Shepherd, supra note 59, at 670.
61. Id. at 612.
62. Zagaris (2008), supra note 59, at 29, 32. This argument has also been made by the
European organizations. See Letter from John Fish, CCBE President to FATF Secretariat
(September 9, 2002) at 3 (responding to the 30 May 2002 consultation) [hereinafter Letter from
John Fish]. There is at least one US scholarly attempt to conduct empirical analysis. See Lawton
P. Cummings & Paul T. Stepnowsky, My Brother’s Keeper: An Empirical Study of Attorney
Facilitation of Money-Laundering Through Commercial Transactions, 2011 J. PROF. LAW. 1,
36-38 (2011). The authors analyzed 40 Second Circuit cases and concluded that in 15% of these
cases, there had been unwilling participation by a lawyer. Despite this finding, they
recommended only that US attorneys be asked to certify that they voluntarily apply the Good
Practices procedure. The FATF now comprises thirty-nine members (thirty-seven states and two
regional organizations).
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the 34 countries that are FATF members, (2) lack of adequate
participation in policy making and implementation by the private
sector, (3) lack of transparency in the decision-making process (the
FATF’s deliberations on the recommendations occurred behind
closed doors, without a record and without participation of elected
officials or the private sector), (4) the use of economic sanctions
and coercion in the way of blacklists as part of FATF’s initiative
against noncooperative territories and jurisdictions without
binding hard law, (5) differential and favorable treatment of its
own members whose inadequacies have not resulted in
blacklisting (e.g., noncompliance by the United States with the
2003 gatekeeper initiatives), (6) the apparent efforts to usurp
critical policy from democratically elected governments without
their participation; and (7) questionable substantive policy design,
such as the absence of any cost-effective measurements of the
recommendations.63

Similar thoughts are expressed by another author for whom “the
FATF has been given an unsupervised and unmonitored license to
address AML and CFT [Counter-Financing of Terrorism] problems,”
and “has done so without thoughtfully considering the merits of its
arguments and pronouncements, without any consideration whatsoever
to costs, without meaningful engagement of the private sector, and with
a willful obliviousness to both the reality and practical consequences
of its work.”64
This critique of the FATF is not isolated and has appeared in a
number of other scholarly works on the general design of global AML
law.65 However, it ignores the important fact that by the time the FATF
had formally issued its 2003 Recommendations, a number of other
democracies had already decided to introduce binding AML standards
onto their own lawyers (in particular, as already noted, the European
Union and Canada). There is also a tendency in US commentary to
overstate the substantive content of what is actually required by the

63. Zagaris (2008), supra note 59, at 31-32.
64. Osborne, supra note 59, at 431.
65. See, e.g., HEBA SHAMS, LEGAL GLOBALIZATION: MONEY LAUNDERING LAW AND
OTHER CASES 228 (2004) (“the FATF is procedurally illegimate on all scores”); Alldridge,
supra note 1, at 443, 463 (“FATF is (deliberately) an unrepresentative agency attempting to
enforce its standards worldwide”; “FATF must show much greater transparency and
accountability than hitherto . . . .”).
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FATF standards.66 Even authors sympathetic to AML objectives
consider that the FATF’s overall approach (addressing lawyers
together with other professions) is too “one-size-fits-all” and therefore
seen by the profession as “fundamentally at odds with lawyers’ historic
and globally-accepted values.”67
Several comments can be made here. First, US scholars seem to
be reading a lot into the mission and influence of FATF, a consultative
body whose role is to produce soft-law standards, and which is entirely
dependent on the actions of governments for the introduction and
enforcement of these norms (and, it might be added, for its own
existence and funding). At some point the concern was even expressed
that the United States might risk expulsion from the FATF, a risk that
was probably never very high.68 In reality, it is the EU that should be
viewed as the powerful actor standing behind the FATF-designed AML
norms. As will be argued below, the European experience is that these
transnational regulatory norms can, in fact, be rolled out in different
guises with varying outcomes that reflect national circumstances and
professional cultures. In contrast, there seems to be an underestimation
in the United States of the degrees of flexibility that must inevitably
accompany such global regimes. It is not impossible to imagine that the
same level of culturally-determined “idiosyncratic” implementation
and enforcement of these norms could occur in the United States as it
has in Europe.
The second impression given by the US response to AML lawyer
regulation is the emphasis that is placed on the idea of “lawyer
exceptionalism.”69 Lawyers are presented not only as zealous
advocates and protectors of clients against the state, but also as
guardians of democracy and the rule of law. This self-image is not
66. For example, Zagaris incorrectly states that the FATF initiative “threatens
professionals with criminal penalties for failing to adhere to emerging standards of anti-money
laundering . . . . due diligence.” Zagaris (2008), supra note 59, at 29. This is not so: the FATF
standards do not require criminalization, although some countries did choose to criminalize
certain breaches, as will be explained below for the United Kingdom. See infra Part III.
67. Terry & Robles, supra note 59, at 721. For full clarity, Laurel Terry views some of the
AML norms favorably (more precisely the KYC/CDD obligation), but she suggests that FATF’s
lack of constructive engagement with the legal profession may have slowed down effective
lawyer participation in AML.
68. See Terry (2010), supra note 59, at 9. The present author’s comment, admittedly, has
the enormous benefit of hindsight.
69. See Sung Hui Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU L. REV.
73 nn.8, 10 (2010).
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unique to the US profession, but it appears to have been more
successfully promoted within its domestic system than in other
countries.70 The continuous references to “gatekeeper” regulation and
the idea that this regulation is antithetical to the role of lawyers also
tied the AML discussion together with other battles waged by the legal
profession in the 2000s, particularly, against the SEC. This in turn
raises the question of the contrast between the failure of foreign-driven
AML gatekeeper measures, which were successfully deflected by the
US profession, and the Sarbanes Oxley-related gatekeeper measures,
which were partially imposed by the US Congress.71
Indeed, although the coincidental timing may be serendipitous, it
is difficult not to observe these two initiatives in a comparative light.
Section 307 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and Part 205 of the SEC Rules
were adopted in the aftermath of the Enron and WordlCom scandals,
in which massive securities fraud was committed by the two companies
leading to their collapse and severe financial loss by employees and
shareholders.72 The crisis led to the loss of self-regulation by the
accounting profession,73 and indictment (followed by collapse) of
Arthur Andersen, one of the then Big Five accounting firms.74 The
question many were asking at the time was “where were the
lawyers?”75 Section 307 was the consequence: it gave express authority
to the SEC to “prescribe minimum standards of professional conduct
for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any

70. See, e.g., the judicial challenges by the European professions described at Part V
below.
71. See the following paragraphs of this Part.
72. Rex Nutting, Enron Workers Lost Everything, MARKET WATCH (Dec. 18, 2001),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/enron-workers-lost-everything-in-collapse-they-say
[https://perma.cc/M9LM-LH2Y].
73. Fast Answers: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), US SEC. &
EXCHANGE
COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answerspcaobhtm.html
[https://perma.cc/T9X6-HSQG] (the PCAOB “is a private-sector, nonprofit corporation created
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to oversee accounting professionals who provide
independent audit reports for publicly traded companies” and “[w]hen Congress created the
PCAOB, it gave the SEC the authority to oversee the PCAOB's operations, to appoint or remove
members, to approve the PCAOB's budget and rules, and to entertain appeals of PCAOB
inspection reports and disciplinary actions”).
74. Scott Horsley, Enron and the Fall of Arthur Andersen, NPR (May 26, 2006),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5435092
[https://perma.cc/MN476JN6].
75. Bernard S. Carrey, Enron-Where were the lawyers? 27 VT. L. REV. 871 (2002-2003).
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way in the representation of issuers.”76 The standards had to “include a
rule requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of
securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the
issuer . . . .”77 Section 307 was a bipartisan proposal by US senators
that “sailed through the Senate,”78 in July 2002, and was said to have
caught the ABA “flat-footed.”79 In November 2002, the SEC went on
to publish its proposed rules for public comment:80 they included not
only “up-the-ladder” reporting (e.g. internal reporting within clients)
but also, in certain circumstances, mandatory disclosure to the SEC that
a lawyer was terminating his services or withdrawing his opinions (a
procedure known as “noisy withdrawal”).81 At that point the ABA and
state bars sprang back into action. They fiercely resisted mandatory
noisy withdrawal, which ended up being removed from the final text of
Part 205 in February 2003.82 After its initial passivity, the profession’s
response to Sarbanes Oxley had become organized and effective. It had
been too late to block the initial legislative action in July 2002 but it
was able to mitigate the aftershock by reducing the scope of lawyer
obligations in the months that followed. In March 2003, one of the
ABA Task Forces on corporate responsibility explained that “lawyers
for [a] corporation—whether employed by the corporation or specially
retained—are not ‘gatekeepers’ of corporate responsibility in the same
fashion as public accounting firms. . . . . Lawyers are first and foremost
counselors to their clients . . . .”83 Drawing on the traditional
representation of lawyers as advocates and defenders, considerable
effort was invested to differentiate lawyers from accountants or other
gatekeeper professions.
76. SEC Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm
[https://perma.cc/M8LA-NVFE].
77. Id.
78. COFFEE, supra note 43, at 217.
79. Id.
80. Kim, supra note 69, at 89.
81. Id. at 90 n.116.
82. Part 205 did, however, retain the rule of permissive external reporting, i.e. the right (as
opposed to the obligation) to report certain violations to the SEC. Kim, supra note 69, at 91
n.128. The difficulty is that it was not exactly replicated in the ABA Model Rules nor in the
conduct rules of many of the 50 states. See Jennifer M. Pacella, Conflicted Counselors:
Retaliation Protections for Attorney-Whistleblowers in an Inconsistent Regulatory Regime, 33
YALE J. REG. 491 (2016).
83. Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 59
BUS. LAW. 145, 156 (2003).

2019]

AML AND LAWYER REGULATION

341

These events coincided with FATF’s preparatory work on AML
standards that could also affect lawyers. A July 2001 meeting of G7
finance ministers in Rome had asked that its process of revising its
recommendations be “open, transparent and consultative.”84 A
consultation paper in preparation for what would become the 2003
Recommendations was therefore published on 30 May 2002.85
According to the account of participants in the ABA’s Gatekeeper
Task Force, the ABA provided its response to that consultation in May
2003, in other words very soon after its successful efforts to reduce the
impact of Part 205.86 The shock of Section 307 was presumably still
fresh in memories, and concerns as to future regulatory direction were
likely high. Did this context color the organization’s response to the
FATF consultation? It is not impossible to think so. Yet at the same
time, the ABA’s consistent opposition to any AML regulation since
2003 can be seen as an indication that their response would have been
the same even without the Sarbanes Oxley alert.
What is equally intriguing is that full-scope Sarbanes Oxley
measures (including mandatory noisy withdrawal) had found
widespread support within the US legal academia. Scholarly voices
pointed out that the ABA’s Model Rules had themselves included noisy
withdrawal,87 and others disagreed with the idea that corporate lawyers
could never act as gatekeepers.88 To date, the same has not been true,
for AML lawyer regulation. At this point, US academia seems not to
have attempted a full throated defense of AML control measures as
they are practiced elsewhere. The soundness of the CDD/ KYC limb is
acknowledged by some,89 but professional resistance to its explicit
84. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 107.
85. Shepherd, supra note 59, at 622.
86. Id. The European CCBE provided its response in September 2002. See Letter from
John Fish, supra note 62.
87. Kim, supra note 69, at 91.
88. See COFFEE, supra note 43, at 193. See also id. at 192 (“presenting the attorney as
primarily an advocate profoundly misrepresents the functional activity of the corporate lawyer”).
His proposal is mandatory review or certification of corporate disclosures by independent
lawyers, presenting this “as a response to both the problem of fragmentation [of legal services
leading to insufficient understanding of client activities] and the need to empower the lawyer as
a gatekeeper”). Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
89. See Jack Sahl, Lawyer Ethics and the Financial Action Task Force: A Call to Action,
59 N.Y.L SCH. L. REV. 457, 483 (2015) (“the [US] bar needs to recognize […] that […]
resistance is unwarranted with respect to the FATF’s CDD principles, which promote both
lawyers’ and the public’s interests.”); Terry & Robles, supra note 59, at 691-92 (arguing that
KYC/CDD obligations are already implied in the Model Rules, and seeming to advocate making
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expression as a mandatory obligation has not yet been overcome.90 Nor
has any defense of the STR/SAR measure been, to date, offered,even
with the associated professional privilege exemption. It is as if the
critique of FATF and its processes had overtaken the domestic question
of how to more effectively enlist US lawyers in AML policy.91
To summarize, the US picture is one of a profession very well
organized for the domestic defense of its interests, which has focused
its efforts on criticizing the FATF as an institution and individual AML
measures on their merits, and has in parallel promoted partial measures
to pre-empt any attempts at federal intervention. However, on the
whole, however, compared to other professions in advanced
democracies, its steadfast refusal to participate in any mandatory AML
measures for almost twenty years places it in the position of an outlier.
IV. LAWYERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: COMPLYING WITH
AMBITIOUS LEGISLATION
Judging by its headcount, the size of its market, and the number
of global UK-headquartered law firms, 92 the British legal profession
this more explicit); Kevin Shepherd, ABA Needs a New Model Legal Ethics Rule, LAW360 (Apr.
6, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/910316/aba-needs-a-new-model-legal-ethics-rule
[https://perma.cc/C92U-96VR] (arguing, contrary to some of his previous positions, that “the
ABA should seriously consider developing and adopting a new model legal ethics rule to ensure
that lawyers conduct the reasonable client due diligence needed to avoid facilitating money
laundering”).
90. Stephanie Brooker & Joel Cohen, Overview of Recent AML Gatekeeper International
and U.S. Developments, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING 2018 1, 7 (Global Legal Group ed., 2018) (referring to the ABA’s continued
opposition but also to “some movement […] within the ABA to adopt a model rule that would
obligate attorneys to perform risk-based due diligence on prospective clients or matters” and
that “significantly, such a rule would subject non-compliant attorneys to discipline by the state
bar rather than by the government”).
91. An additional factor is that the US conversation on lawyers’ AML role has become
intertwined with the ABA’s equally long-standing resistance to corporate transparency reform,
also an AML global norm. See Terry & Robles, supra note 59, at 637-38 n.39. Scholarly
positions critical of the ABA do seem to be appearing in regard to this last policy regarding
corporate transparency. See, e.g., Matthew Stephenson, Why does the American Bar Association
Oppose Beneficial Ownership Transparency Reform?, THE FACT COALITION (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://thefactcoalition.org/american-bar-association-aba-oppose-beneficial-ownershiptransparency-reform?utm_medium=blog [https://perma.cc/6TMA-JZYL].
92. The number of practicing solicitors and barristers is approximately 167,000 in 2019.
See, for solicitors, Population of solicitors in England and Wales, SOLICITORS REG. AUTH.,
https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-we-work/reports/statistics/regulated-communitystatistics/data/population_solicitors/ [https://perma.cc/F63L-99X6] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019).
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might be viewed as the second most influential after the US profession,
certainly in the commercial sector.93 Its attitude towards AML
regulation, however, has been the polar opposite of the American
attitude. In no small part, this may be explained by the British
government’s early embrace of AML regulation, and its willingness to
thrust the full force of these rules onto its lawyers from the very outset.
In contrast to other countries, AML awareness seems to have
appeared in the United Kingdom comparatively early. By October 2001
the UK lawmakers had already presented their bill for the future
Proceeds of Crime Act (“POCA”), an ambitious instrument creating
new tools against money-laundering, in other words they had acted in
this area before the September 11 attacks and the Second Directive.94
In 2002, the English Law Society issued what was already a revised
professional guidance note on the subject.95 In 2003, POCA was then

For barristers, see Statistics on practising barristers, BAR STANDARDS BD.,
https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/news-publications/research-and-statistics/statisticsabout-the-bar/practising-barristers.html [https://perma.cc/2FPV-VAR8] (last visited Nov. 30,
2019). In addition there are a large number of unregulated legal practitioners in the UK practising
in what is known as the “alternative” (i.e. unregulated) legal services market. The sector is
considered to be the largest in Europe and a significant contributor to the British economy. See,
also, the figures drawn from the US Trade Representative presented by Laurel Terry at an ABA
US-UK
Roundtable
in
November
2018,
available
at
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/Laurel_Terry_US_UK_US
TR_emailed_2-slide_format.pdf [https://perma.cc/824H-4XWT] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019).
93. The relative domination of the US and UK professions has been commented on
elsewhere and from many different angles. For French efforts to better understand the economic
benefits of having a globally influential legal system and profession, see PASCAL DURANDBARTHEZ & FRANCOIS LENGLART, CHOISIR SON DROIT: CONSÉQUENCES ÉCONOMIQUES DU
CHOIX DU DROIT APPLICABLE DANS LES CONTRATS INTERNATIONAUX (2012). For a critique of
US/UK dominance, see KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES
WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 135 (2019) (commenting on “the remarkable dominance of English
and New York law for the coding of global capital”).
94. See generally Proceeds of Crime Bill, 2001 (Bill 31/330) (Gr. Brit..), available at
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmbills/031/2002031.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MB7R-N6CZ]. The bill received Royal assent in July 2002. Proceeds of Crime
Act
2002,
c.
29
(U.K.)
[hereinafter
POCA], available
at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/692/pdfs/uksi_20170692_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7JTA-4FVM]. The “failure to disclose: regulated sector” offence was already
at Section 324 of the bill and became Section 330 of the act once adopted. In its original (2002)
expression the provision applied to solicitors conducting investment or financial activities in
addition to their principal activity.
95. Money Laundering Legislation: Guidance for Solicitors, THE LAW SOCIETY (Aug. 14,
2002),
https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/advice/practicenotes/aml/documents/Money-laundering-legislation-guidance-for-solicitors/
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amended to incorporate new elements from the Second Directive.96
What is remarkable with POCA generally is that it went well beyond
the requirements of the Second Directive (or FATF standards), by
actually criminalizing AML duties and in particular the obligation to
report suspicions.97 This was achieved by way of a specific offense for
“failure to report” that became applicable to all professional legal
advisers in the “regulated sector,”98 i.e., lawyers performing the
designated transactional or financial activities.99 Following POCA and
attendant 2003 Money Laundering Regulations,100 the English Law
Society produced a pilot Anti-Money Laundering Guidance in 2004,101
and a flow of suspicious transaction reporting by solicitors followed
quickly thereafter, reaching very high numbers in the early years (e.g.,
11,300 reports in the year 2006/2007).102 The reporting flow has since
significantly abated, but it is still higher than in other European
countries. There can be little doubt that this significant flow of
reporting activity by the British legal profession is explained, first and
foremost, by the seriousness of the potential risk of criminal
sanctions.103
[https://perma.cc/BA4N-9HUC] (explaining that the 1993 Money Laundering Regulations
applied to solicitors conducting investment or financial activities, see at 7).
96. POCA, supra note 94.
97. Colin Tyre, Anti-Money Laundering Legislation: Implementation of the FATF Forty
Recommendations in the European Union, 2010 J. PROF. LAW. 69, 77 (2010) (“… the UK went
further in the 2002 Act than it was required to do by the terms of the First and Second
Directives”).
98. POCA, supra note 94, § 330.
99. Id. The list of these activities is set out at Schedule 9 of POCA. It is similar to the
language of the FATF Recommendations and Second Directive and includes: the buying and
selling of real estate or business entities; managing of client money, securities or other assets;
opening or management of bank, savings or securities accounts; organisation of contributions
necessary for the creation, operation or management of companies; creation, operation or
management of trusts, companies or similar structures. Id.
100. Money laundering regulations were issued in 1993, 2003 and 2007. Those currently
in force are The Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on
the
Payer)
Regulations
2017,
available
at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/692/pdfs/uksi_20170692_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZFL7-YYT2].
101. Money Laundering: Guidance for Solicitors, THE LAW SOCIETY (Jan. 2004),
https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/advice/practice-notes/archive/aml/moneylaundering-guidance-2004/ [https://perma.cc/JTS5-SPFK].
102. SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIME AGENCY, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS REGIME,
ANNUAL REPORT 2008 41 (2008).
103. The criminal risk is not an empty threat and solicitors have been imprisoned for
failure to report. See, e.g.,. Regina v. Philip Griffiths, [2006] EWCA Crim 2155 (U.K.).
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Chart 1: Number of “suspicious activity reports” (SARs) filed by
British legal professionals.104
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Annual reports by the British FIUs (first the Serious Organized
Crime Agency, now the National Crime Agency) have provided
various details over the years on the typology of these reports. At
present, they mostly emanate from three areas of particular risk:
company and trust formation, conveyancing (i.e. real estate
transactions), and the holding of money in client trust accounts.
According to recent statistics, approximately half of the SARs are said
to relate to property transactions,105 which does not seem surprising.
Typically, the reports are filed before completion of transactions in
relation to which a suspicion has arisen, or before accepting or
transferring money in client accounts. The majority of reports are socalled “defense against money laundering” reports (“DAML”) (in
2017/18, they represented 1,857 out of 2,592).106 These used to be
104. NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY, UK FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT: SUSPICIOUS
ACTIVITY REPORTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2019 8 [hereinafter SAR 2019]; NATIONAL CRIME
AGENCY, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS (SARS), ANNUAL REPORT 2018 6 [hereinafter SAR
2018]; NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS (SARS), ANNUAL REPORT
2017 12 [hereinafter SAR 2017]; NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY,: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS
(SARS), ANNUAL REPORT 2015 11 [hereinafter SAR 2015]; NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY,
SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS (SARS), ANNUAL REPORT 2014 12 [hereinafter SAR 2014];
SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIME AGENCY, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS REGIME, ANNUAL
REPORT 2010 53-54; SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIME AGENCY, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS
REGIME, ANNUAL REPORT 2009 45 (2009); SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIME AGENCY, SUSPICIOUS
ACTIVITY REPORTS REGIME, ANNUAL REPORT 2008 41 (2008). The numbers for 2007-2010
include SARs filed by barristers, solicitors, and “legal other.” The numbers for 2011-2013
include SARs filed by solicitors. The numbers for 2014-2019 include SARs filed by
“independent legal professionals.” All of the annual reports cover a twelve-month calendar
period straddling the designated reporting years except for the 2017 report which covered
eighteen months (October 2015 to March 2017).
105. SRA Risk Assessment, SOLICITORS REG. AUTH. (Mar. 2, 2018),
www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-we-work/reports/aml-risk-assessment.page [https://perma.cc/GN2G4A38].
106. SAR 2018, supra note 104, at 15-18. The numbers include SARs filed by barristers,
solicitors and “legal other.” Id.
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called “consent reports,” involve a latency period of seven working
days and provide the reporting lawyers with a future defense against a
principal money-laundering offense, thereby enabling them to mitigate
their personal risk. Importantly however, these reports do not
automatically require that lawyers withdraw from representation and
can be filed by any persons, i.e. are not limited by POCA to the
“regulated sector.”107 Situations can therefore arise where both a
lawyer and her client file DAML reports with regard to the same object
or transaction of a third party. This may be one explanation why British
lawyers have not systematically interpreted the POCA reporting
obligation as placing them in an excessively adversarial or disloyal
position towards their clients.108 The objections that have been
expressed by the profession are not so much that the duties are contrary
to traditional rules of ethics or professional conduct, but that the regime
is overly onerous in terms of compliance costs and personal risk
management (see more on this below).
The English regime is, in truth, very complex. It has been
addressed in regularly updated guidance notes produced by the
professional organizations (initially the Law Society for solicitors, now
a combined group called the “Legal Sector Affinity Group,” which
deals with AML for the combined professions and unregulated
practitioners).109 The latest guidance note, dated 2018, is more than 150
pages long.110 It sets out in elaborate detail the extent of mandatory
CDD procedures and, importantly, the rules regarding reporting to the
FIU. The main objective is to balance the tension between the criminal
risk incurred by individual lawyers who fail to report, and their
107. See POCA, supra note 94, §§ 337, 338 (which relieve persons from obligations of
confidentiality that may otherwise exist including outside of the regulated sector).
108. See Hilary Hurd, Applying Anti-Money Laundering Reporting Obligations on
Lawyers: the UK Experience, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (June 2, 2018),
https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2018/06/08/applying-anti-money-laundering-reportingobligations-on-lawyers-the-uk-experience/ [https://perma.cc/5XKR-YK8U].
109. The British legal profession was liberalised by the Legal Services Act 2007 and
comprises a number of independent practitioners who do not need to belong to one of the
regulated professions (the latter including solicitors and barristers, but also legal executives,
licensed conveyancers, notaries, costs lawyers, patent attorneys or trademark attorneys).
110. See generally Legal Sector Affinity Group, Anti-Money Laundering Guidance for the
Legal Sector, THE LAW SOCIETY (Mar. 2018), https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/policycampaigns/articles/anti-money-laundering-guidance/
[https://perma.cc/V2CD-QL39].
As
follows from the previous footnote it is addressed to all “independent legal professionals” and
applies “across the entire legal sector” regardless of membership in one of the regulated
professions. Id at 11.
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obligation to protect information that is covered either by “privileged
circumstances,” a new legal category introduced by POCA and
described as a transposition of the EU Directives,111 or by the
traditional English common law “legal professional privilege” (itself
comprising “legal advice privilege” and “litigation privilege”).112
These categories are not identical, respond to different definitions, and
both operate to exclude reporting. Their interpretation in each
individual case requires careful factual and legal analysis before a
report can be filed. It is generally considered that in the early years at
least, the complexity of the regime may have led to strategies of
precautionary or defensive over-reporting, particularly in the absence
of a minimal threshold.113 The fact that the number of reports has
steadily declined over the years of annual SARs statistics production is
therefore worthy of note. It may indicate that the profession has
improved its grasp of the regime and no longer feels the need for
defensive over-reporting. It is also possible that improved upstream
CDD/KYC procedures have reduced the intake of AML-exposed
clients and matters.
An interesting question is why UK lawmakers decided to
criminalize reporting duties in the first place. Full criminalization of
anti-money laundering duties was not required by the FATF or Second
Directive, or indeed under the Fifth Directive currently being rolled

111. Id, at 95 (“receipt of information in privileged circumstances is not the same as legal
professional privilege. It is a creation of POCA designed to comply with the reporting
exemptions set out in the European directives”).
112. Id. at 100-02. For an analysis of the articulation between the failure to disclose offense
and English rules on legal privilege, see John A. Terrill II & Michael A. Breslow, The Role of
Lawyers in Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Lessons from the English
Approach, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 433 (2015), concluding that “the U.K. approach of addressing
matters of legal professional privilege through POCA is both complicated and worthy of the
skepticism of the American Bar.” Id. at 454.
113. “Defensive over-reporting” is when reporting agents are overly cautious and prefer to
send a larger number of reports to FIUs than might be warranted by the specific facts in
individual cases. The phenomenon is known in financial crime research and has been
particularly examined in the UK banking sector. See, e.g., Amandine Scherrer, Fighting Tax
Crimes – Cooperation between Financial Intelligence Units: Ex-Post Impact Assessment, EUR.
PARILIAMENT
45-46
(Mar.
2017),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/598603/EPRS_STU(2017)598603
_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/35K9-C4CD]. In the context of English solicitors, see Tyre, supra
note 97, at 78; Terrill II & Breslow, supra note 112, at 445.
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out.114 As mentioned above, the UK Proceeds of Crime bill creating the
failure to report offense was introduced prior to the final adoption of
the Second Directive.115 What were the reasons? One explanation
would seem to lie in the general criminal justice agenda that was
pushed in those years by Tony Blair and his Labour Party and,
according to commentators, a combination of “moral imperative”116
and desire to solidify the government’s “law and order” credentials.117
To some extent, AML concerns in Britain are also traditionally
exacerbated by the extent of financial ties with offshore financial
centers located in its overseas territories or crown dependencies.118
Many provisions of POCA were novel at the time. For example, they
were amongst the first to extend money laundering beyond traditional
predicate offenses, like drug trafficking, to all crimes, remove minimal
thresholds, and punish violations not only by criminal sanctions and
confiscation, but also by civil recovery measures and the levying of tax
on the related benefits.119 These were significant changes compared to
previous practices. At a time when lawmakers in other countries
seemed far less enthusiastic, the United Kingdom was positioning itself
114. The Sixth Directive (Oct. 2018) seems to have changed the situation by expanding
and unifying the criminal law treatment of money laundering. It is unclear whether and how this
will apply to the obligation to report suspicious activities. See Peter Burrell & Michael Thorne,
The Sixth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive: What will change?, WILLKIE FARR &
GALLAGHER
(Feb.
12,
2019),
https://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2019/02/The_Sixth_EU_Anti_Money_La
undering_Directive_What_Will_Change.pdf [https://perma.cc/KFU3-HKAT].
115. See the discussion on the UK Proceeds of Crime bill above and supra note 94.
116. Peter Alldridge & Ann Mumford, Tax Evasion and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002,
25 LEGAL STUD. 353, 353 n.2 (2005) (citing Tony Blair declaring in a speech that “[I]t simply
is not right in Modern Britain that millions of law-abiding people work hard to earn a living,
whilst a few live handsomely off the profits of crime. The undeserved trappings of success
enjoyed by criminals are an affront to the hard-working majority”).
117. Alldridge, supra note 1, 440; PETER ALLDRIDGE, WHAT WENT WRONG WITH
MONEY LAUNDERING LAW? 76 (2016) (“Tony Blair did very well out of profits of crime, and
now David Cameron is appropriating it to his own ends”).
118. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, MOSCOW’S GOLD:
RUSSIAN
CORRUPTION
IN
THE
UK
28
(2018),
available
at
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/932/932.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K2K7-R7FW] (“While the Government should continue to respect the
autonomy and constitutional integrity of the Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies on
devolved matters, money laundering is now a matter of national security, and therefore
constitutionally under the jurisdiction of the UK. The Overseas Territories and Crown
Dependencies are important routes through which dirty money enters the UK. This cannot
continue”).
119. Alldridge & Mumford, supra note 116, at 358-59.
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as a front-runner in the fight against financial crime and gold-plating
its domestic measures.120 In this general political context, the inclusion
of criminally-sanctioned lawyer reporting was presumably considered
a minor feature of the overall agenda. The legal profession did express
its opposition, arguing that the bill was too broadly drafted and would
lead to a flow of “useless reports related to trivial breaches.”121 The
debate on regime effectiveness continues to this day, although a recent
consultation regarding the continuance of the regime did not lead to
any significant change.122
The British AML regime for lawyers raises a number of additional
questions (which this Article does not claim to answer). It could be an
example of legislative overkill in light of the balance between costs
generated and the regime’s overall effectiveness in achieving
successful criminal prosecutions of primary offenders. The
comparatively meager headcount of regulator staff also seems to be a
concern. For instance, it was recently alleged that only twenty five
persons at the NCA were tasked with processing the total number of
SARs, including those filed by the entire British banking sector.123 In
contrast, a survey conducted by the Law Society in 2008 indicated that
law firms spent an average of four hours per week analyzing suspicions
and making disclosures.124 Even with the drop in number of reports,
voices within the profession claim that the regime is “cumbersome,

120. See Tyre, supra note 97, at 77.
121. Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2009),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/jan/15/proceeds-crime-act
[https://perma.cc/U3W6-458U].
122. The Law Commission’s report on reforming the SAR regime – guidance over
change?, DENTONS (July 8, 2019), https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2019/july/8/thelaw-commissions-report-on-reforming-the-sar-regime
[https://perma.cc/876H-7HUH]
(concluding that “little has been done to address the real concerns expressed about the operation
of the regime”).
123. LAW COMM’N, Anti-Money Laundering: the SARs Regime 3, par. 1.25 (Consultation
Paper No. 236, 20 July 20, 2018), available at https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcomprod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2018/07/Anti-Money-Laundering-the-SARs-RegimeConsultation-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6W7-CDBP]. Banks filed 371,522 SARs in the
annual period 2017/2018, representing approximately 80% of the total of 463,938). SAR 2018,
supra note 104, at 15-16.
124. Id. at ¶ 1.22. See, e.g., Britain’s War on Dirty Money Lacks Oomph, THE ECONOMIST
(Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/10/11/britains-waron-dirty-money-lacks-oomph [https://perma.cc/5KK4-LPJV].
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inefficient, and most importantly ineffective.”125 Their position seems
supported by British scholars who pinpoint the absence of empirical
research on overall effectiveness.126 For some of these scholars,
administrative or professional control by self-regulating bodies might
be more effective than criminal prosecution, particularly in light of the
difficulty in successfully prosecuting facilitators who merely harbor a
suspicion rather than principal offenders. They write that “regulatory
action such as closing down a law firm or controlling how a lawyer
may practice provides more direct public protection and indeed
disruption, at less social cost, than does prosecution.”127
A further question relates to the profession itself and its inability
to have its views heard by the government over the years. Here, the
division of the profession may be one explanation. As is well known,
English (and Welsh) lawyers are divided between barristers and
solicitors (with similar categories in Scotland and Northern Ireland).
This division is not only functional but also relevant, at least to some
extent, to traditional roles in society, with barristers forming a kind of
aristocracy of the profession. It is mainly solicitors who are subject to
AML obligations, as they (with conveyancing agents) are those most
involved in the kind of transactional activities that give rise to the AML
obligations.128 In contrast, barristers tend to specialize in contentious
work that does not by nature fall within AML regulation. This division
of labor may have affected the ability of solicitors to have their views
fully heard at the political level. The presence since the Legal Services
Act 2007 of a contingent of unregulated and therefore unrepresented
practitioners may also be a factor.129 Finally, the attitude of existing
representative organizations is also of interest. Contrary to the ABA in
the United States, the English Law Society does not appear to view its
125. Richard McGarry & Stephenson Harwood, SARs: A Need for Change but in which
Direction? – The Law Commission Consults, STEPHENSON HARWOOD (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://www.shlegal.com/news/sars-a-need-for-change-but-in-which-direction---the-lawcommission-consults [https://perma.cc/6KJ6-XRHL].
126. David Middleton & Michael Levi, Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Organized Crime,
Lawyers and the Regulation of Legal Services, 55 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 647, 649 n.1 (2015) (“The
UK legal profession is by far the most likely in the world to report suspicions of money
laundering by their clients, though there are no serious studies rigorously analysing either
outputs or outcomes from these reports . . .”). See ALLDRIDGE, supra note 117, 77-78.
127. Middleton & Levi, supra note 126, at 649-50.
128. See SAR 2018, supra note 104, at 15-16 (reflecting the significantly lower number of
SARs filed every year by barristers e.g. 4 in 2018/2019, compared with 2,437 by solicitors).
129. See supra note 109.
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role as that of vocal advocate defending solicitors against AML
obligations imposed onto them from the outside. Their position seems
rather the contrary. On its website the Law Society declares its
commitment “to making the UK a hostile environment for illicit
finances by helping solicitors in England and Wales act as gatekeepers
to the UK financial system.”130 In their commentary on the 2017/2018
reporting statistics, they wrote that “the legal sector still isn’t
submitting enough SARs. We do not believe that there is a right number
of SARs and instead urge solicitors to make a quality SAR when they
spot suspicious activity.”131 This is a very different tone from that
adopted by the ABA when confronting attempts to introduce AML
obligations on US attorneys.
In summary, the full scope of AML measures have for fifteen
years been implemented by the British legal profession.132 The
profession has complied with legislation and engaged with FIU
reporting more than in other countries. Although this seems to have
generated financial costs for the profession and the overall empirical
effectiveness of the regime remains under question, the profession has
been fairly understated in its challenge of the regime and has not, in
particular, attempted to use the courts to do so. This is despite the fact
that British AML regulation was significantly more ambitious from the
outset than what international standards prescribed.
V. FRANCE: COURT CHALLENGES AND ENLISTING THE BAR
AUTHORITIES
Similar to the United Kingdom, the French legal profession is
divided. The largest group are the advocates (avocats), who have a full
monopoly on court representation and outside legal advice and are
130.
Anti-Money
Laundering,
THE
LAW
SOCIETY,
https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/risk-compliance/anti-money-laundering/
[https://perma.cc/LE62-3XXG] (last visited Nov. 19, 2019).
131. National Crime Agency SARs report: Implications for the legal sector, THE LAW
SOCIETY (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/risk-compliance/antimoney-laundering/nca-sars-report-2018/ [https://perma.cc/XRJ6-NUVV].
132. In its latest Mutual Evaluation (2018), FATF reported the United Kingdom as
“largely compliant” with regard to Recommendations 22 and 23 of the 2012 Recommendations.
FATF, Anti-money Laundering and Counter-terrorist Financing Measures United Kingdom:
Mutual
Evaluation
Report,
FATF
209
(Dec.
2018),
https://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-Kingdom-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K64B-AGYL].
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placed under the professional authority of regional bar associations,
followed by the notaries (notaires), whose main activity is to handle
property and estate transactions.133 Both groups are regulated
separately under the auspices of dedicated laws.134 In-house lawyers do
not belong to the regulated professions and do not benefit from any
professional privilege (referred to as “professional secrecy,” secret
professionnel).135
One the early peculiarities of the French regime is that notaries
have been required to report suspicious transactions as far back as
1998, well before the Second Directive.136 This is explained by the fact
that they have historically had a legal monopoly on all property
transactions, in which they act not so much as legal advisers to the
parties, but as public officers (“officier ministériel”), in other words
representatives of the state who are also tasked with the collection of
transfer taxes.137 The status and traditions of advocates are very
different. When AML regulation was first mooted for them by the
Second Directive, their response was closer to the American position
of outright defiance than to the British acceptance. Legislation to
implement the Second Directive was first introduced in 2004,138
133. There are approximately 69,000 advocates and 14,500 notaries. See Les chiffres clés
de la profession d’avocat [Key figures of the legal profession], CONSEIL NATIONAL DES
BARREAUX [NATIONAL BAR COUNCIL] https://www.cnb.avocat.fr/fr/les-chiffres-cles-de-laprofession-davocat [https://perma.cc/KPK4-9DZX] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019); Rapport
Annuel du Notariat [Annual Report of the Notary], NOTAIRES DE FRANCE [NOTAIRE OF
FRANCE] (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.notaires.fr/fr/profession-notaire/rapport-annuel-dunotariat/le-notariat-en-chiffres [https://perma.cc/HX5L-DUJR]. The number of regulated
professionals is therefore less than half of the British number, for population and GDP that are
similar.
134. Compare Law Nr. 71-113 of 31 December 1971 (amended by Law Nr. 90-1259 of 31
December 1990) (regarding avocats) with Ordinance Nr. 45-2590 of 2 November 1945
(regarding notaires); Ordinance Nr 58-1270 of 22 December 1958 (regarding judges and
magistrates).
135. See, e.g., L’avocat, le juriste d’entreprise et le secret [The advocate, the in-house
lawyer, and secrecy], CHRISTIAN CHARRIERE-BOURNAZEL (Oct. 28, 2013),
http://www.charriere-bournazel.com/l%E2%80%99avocat-le-juriste-d%E2%80%99entrepriseet-le-secret/ [https://perma.cc/5ZN2-NADK].
136. Law Nr. 98-546 of 2 July 1998 codified at Article L-561.2.13 of the Monetary and
Financial Code (CMF). C. MON. ET FIN. [MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CODE] art. L 561.3 (Fr.).
137. The Role of the French Notaire, NOTAIRES DE FRANCE [NOTAIRE OF FRANCE] (Nov.
23, 2017), https://www.notaires.fr/en/notaire/role-notaire-and-his-principal-activities/rolenotaire [https://perma.cc/DXX9-WNFH].
138. Law Nr. 2004-130 of 11 February 2004. Loi 2004-130 du 11 février 2004 réformant
le statut de certaines professions judiciaires ou juridiques, des experts judiciaires, des conseils
en propriété industrielle et des experts en ventes aux enchères publiques (1) [Law 2004-130 of
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followed by implementing decrees in 2006.139 Both the law and the
decree were immediately challenged by the bar organizations (led by
the National Bar Council, a federation of the regional bars) before the
Conseil d’Etat, France’s highest administrative court, leading to the
removal of some of the decree provisions on direct communication
channels between advocates and the French FIU.140 When further
implementing legislation and decrees followed in the footsteps of the
Third Directive, in 2009,141 they too were challenged by the bar
organizations before the Conseil d’Etat, this time unsuccessfully.142
The French bar had refrained from taking their case against the Second
Directive and implementing provisions to the European Court of
Justice, as a petition by the Belgian bar to their Constitutional Court
had already made its way to Luxembourg for a preliminary ruling on
the compatibility with Article 6 of the European Convention of Human
Rights (concerning rights to a fair trial). It was bad fortune for all the
European professions, therefore, when in 2007 the ECJ upheld the

11 February 2004 on Reforming the Status of Certain Legal Professions, Judicial Experts, and
Intellectual Property Advisers, and Auction Experts], C. MON. ET FIN. [MONETARY AND
FINANCIAL CODE] art. L-561.1 (Fr.).
139. Décret 2006-736 du 26 juin 2006 relatif à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux
et modifiant le code monétaire et financier (partie réglementaire) [Decree 2006-736 of June 26,
2006 on the Fight Against Money Laundering and Modifying the Monetary and Financial Code],
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],
June 27, 2006, at 9625.
140. CE Sect., April 10, 2008, Rec. Lebon 296845, available at
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriAdmin.do?idTexte=CETATEXT000018624326
[https://perma.cc/GY3Y-H5U5].
141. JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Jan. 31, 2009, p. 1819. Ord. nº 2009-104 du 30 janvier 2009 relative à la prévention
de l'utilisation du système financier aux fins de blanchiment de capitaux et de financement du
terrorisme [Ordinance 2009-104 of 30 January 2009 on the prevention of the use of the financial
system to launder money and finance terrorism]. The CNB’s sweeping critique of its provisions
was expressed in a report presented to its general assembly of 13 and 14 February 2009. Rapport
sur L’ordonnance de transposition de la 3ème directive anti-blanchiment [Report on the
transposition order of the third anti-money laundering directive], CONSEIL NATIONAL DES
BARREAUX
[NATIONAL
BAR
COUNCIL]
(Feb.
13
and
14,
2009),
https://encyclopedie.avocats.fr/GED_BWZ/192175791035/CNB-RP2009-0213_TXT_Blanchiment-ordonnance_Sacaze(P).pdf [https://perma.cc/W2NU-MFTU].
142.
CE,
Oct.
14,
2011,
Rec.
Lebon
332126,
available
at
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriAdmin.do?oldAction=rechJuriAdmin&idTexte=CET
ATEXT000024669907&fastReqId=959932372&fastPos=1 [https://perma.cc/H2VF-EJ8W].
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Second Directive’s AML provisions on lawyers, on reasoning that will
presented below.143
The French bar’s judicial challenges were not at an end, however.
One of the members of the Paris Bar Council, Patrick Michaud, had
brought an individual case before the Conseil d’Etat against the
National Bar Council’s own AML implementation regulations adopted
in 2007, 144 arguing that they were contrary to Articles 7 (legal
certainty) and 8 (right to privacy) of the ECHR.145 In 2010, that petition
was rejected by the Conseil d’Etat.146 Mr. Michaud’s next move was to
file a case against France, before the European Court of Human Rights
in Strasbourg, under Articles 6 (right to a fair trial), 7 (legal certainty),
and 8 (right to privacy) of the ECHR. The only claim seriously
entertained by the Strasbourg Court was the one under Article 8,147 but
it too was ultimately rejected. This final defeat marked the end of eight
years of continuous judicial action by the French (and Belgian) bars
against the Second Directive and ensuing national implementation
measures. Contrary to the Canadian profession (which convinced its
Supreme Court to strike down their AML reporting obligations), the
European professions were ultimately unsuccessful in their two highest
courts of Luxembourg and Strasbourg.
The arguments that were presented in all of these proceedings
were very similar to the ones still being made by the US bar. It was
argued that the principles of professional secrecy and independence of

143. Case C-305/05, Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et Germanophone v. Conseil des
Ministres, 2007 E.C.R. I-5335 [hereinafter Ordre des Barreaux].
144. See Conseil national des barreaux [CNB] [National Bar Council] decision No. 2007002, July 12, 2007, J.O. 13331 (Fr.) (“Décision à caractère normatif n° 2007-002 portant
adoption d’un règlement relatif aux procédures internes destinées à mettre en oeuvre les
obligations de lutte contre le blanchiment des capitaux et le financement du terrorisme &
Dispositif de contrôle interne destiné à assurer le respect des procédures”).
145. Michaud v. France, App. No. 12323/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), ¶ 15 [hereinafter
Michaud].
146. CE,
July
23,
2010,
Rec.
Lebon 309993,
available
at
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriAdmin.do?idTexte=CETATEXT000022512920
[https://perma.cc/7DNL-VH4U] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019).
147. Michaud, supra note 145. The Strasbourg Court ruled that Mr. Michaud did not have
standing to bring a claim under Article 6 (right to a fair trial) or Article 7 (legal certainty),
because he himself had not suffered any proceedings and the rights of which he was alleging
breach were not his own but those of others (i.e., clients). Michaud, ¶¶ 133-34.
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lawyers are essential to democracy and European society,148 that these
principles are protected under the ECHR,149 that lawyers have a duty
of loyalty,150 that clients must be able to maintain trust and confide in
them,151 and that such principles are eroded by the Second Directive’s
AML reporting obligation in a manner that is neither necessary,
consistent with justice or proportionate to the public interest at hand.152
The arguments were presented by the plaintiffs, Mr. Michaud and the
Belgian French-speaking and German-speaking Bar, but also by the
CCBE, an organization representing the European bars and law
societies, which was authorized to appear as intervening third party.
There appear to be three main reasons why they were unsuccessful.
First, the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts found that AML rules
only applied in the context of transactional or financial activities that
are different from the traditional role of lawyers as legal counselors and
advocates, and that it is the latter that form the basis of their
professional right to secrecy.153 Under the Second Directive, AML
procedures do not apply when a lawyer is engaged in the provision of
legal advice, or once she is called upon for assistance in defending a
client in contentious proceedings. At those points, the lawyer is exempt
of any reporting obligations regardless of when information was
received or obtained.154 Second, the Strasbourg Court found persuasive
the fact that the Second Directive allows a filter between individual
lawyers and financial intelligence units, in the form of the right given
to each member state to organize communications only through
national bar authorities.155 This, indeed, is the mechanism that has been
implemented in France (see more on this below). Finally, both Courts
were of the opinion that money-laundering constitutes a serious threat
148. Opinion of Miguel Poiares Maduro, supra note 19, ¶ 36 (referring to arguments by
plaintiffs presenting lawyers’ secrecy as a principle found in all democracies and with roots in
the “very foundations of European society”); Michaud, supra note 145, ¶ 60.
149. Opinion of Miguel Poiares Maduro, supra note 19, ¶ 24.
150. Id. ¶ 29 (the French version of the Opinion uses the expression “devoir de loyauté”);
Michaud, supra note 145, ¶ 67.
151. Opinion of Miguel Poiares Maduro, supra note 19, ¶¶ 37, 54; Ordre des Barreaux,
supra note 143, ¶¶ 13-14 ; Michaud, supra note 145, ¶ 63.
152. Opinion of Miguel Poiares Maduro, supra note 19, ¶ 79; Michaud, supra note 145,
¶¶ 63-64.
153. Ordre des Barreaux, supra note 143, ¶¶ 33-35 ; Michaud, supra note 145, ¶¶ 27, 12728.
154. Id.
155. Michaud supra note 145, ¶¶ 129-30.
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to society and democracy, and that AML interference in the
professional rights of advocates for the activities listed by the Directive
was therefore justified and not disproportionate.156
The French bar was disappointed by these outcomes, but it
regrouped and issued its next generation of AML professional
guidelines. 157 Much of the focus is placed on the CDD measures, with
detailed forms being provided on the type of verifications that must be
performed before clients can be engaged or matters accepted (including
beneficial owner identification).158 The STR obligation, for its part, is
organized in such a manner that all communications must be sent to the
head of the regional bar (bâtonnier), who is the only person authorized
to enter into direct contact with the FIU.159 No direct communications
between the FIU and individual advocates are permitted.160
Transmission to the FIU of suspicious transaction reports received by
the bâtonnier is not automatic,161 the bâtonnier’s role being to “assist
colleagues, verify reports and ensure that no rules on professional
secrecy are infringed.”162 A “confidential dialogue” may take place
between the reporting advocate and the bâtonnier, which is not to be
disclosed to the FIU.163 Most importantly, regardless of whether a
suspicious transaction report is transmitted by the bâtonnier and
regardless of the FIU’s response, the reporting lawyer must

156. Ordre des Barreaux, supra note 143, ¶ 36; Michaud, supra note 145, ¶ 131.
157. CONSEIL NATIONAL DES BARREAUX [NATIONAL BAR COUNCIL], GUIDE PRATIQUE:
LUTTE CONTRE LE BLANCHIMENT ET LE FINANCEMENT DU TERRORISME [PRACTICAL GUIDE :
FIGHTING BLEACHING AND TERRORIST FINANCING] (2017) [hereinafter CNB Guide Pratique].
158. Id. at 16-21.
159. Id. at 28.
160. Id. at 26 (“aucune relation directe entre Tracfin et un avocat n’est . . . permise” [“No
direct relationship between Tracfin and a lawyer is. . . permitted”]).
161. Id. at 28 (“le bâtonnier ne retransmet pas de manière automatique à Tracfin les
déclarations de soupçon qui lui sont adressées par les avocats. Son rôle consiste d’abord à
assister ses confrères et à contrôler les déclarations reçues pour s’assurer de l’absence de tout
manquement aux règles du secret professionnel” [“The bâtonnier does not automatically
transmit to Tracfin the suspicious activity report sent to him by the advocate. His role is first to
assist his colleagues and to control the reports received to ensure the absence of any breach of
the rules of professional secrecy”]).
162. Id.
163. Id. (“Un dialogue, dont la nature confidentielle peut être opposée à Tracfin, peut ainsi
s’établir entre le bâtonnier et l’avocat déclarant” [“A dialogue, the confidential nature of which
can be opposed to Tracfin, can thus be established between the president and the reporting
advocate”]).
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immediately terminate his retainer or representation.164 The implication
here is that for the French bar authorities, the very expression by a
lawyer of her suspicions in writing means that she is no longer able to
carry out her duties objectively and independently, and must therefore
cease to act. One sees that the essence of these guidelines is very
different from the British approach to suspicious transaction reporting.
It may not be surprising, in this context, that the number of suspicious
transaction reports received by the French FIU from the bar has
remained very low since 2007.
Chart 2: Number of STR reports received from the French bar
(source: Tracfin annual reports)165
Year

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

STRs

1

3

2

0

1

4

6

1

0

4

0

1

There are several possible interpretations for these low figures.
An uncharitable view would be that the French bar is openly defying
its legal obligations, or that the French regime is not sufficiently
dissuasive (failure to report not being sanctioned criminally, as in the
United Kingdom). Such behavior would seem self-defeating, however,
for a profession that sets great store in its public reputation. More
constructive explanations can be found which are more persuasive. The
164. Id. at 31 (“Dès lors que l’avocat a exprimé un soupçon, il a le devoir de se déporter
immédiatement, il cesse toute participation, peu importe le retour de Tracfin” [“Once the
reporting advocate has expressed a suspicion, he has the duty to withdraw immediately and cease
any participation, regardless of the reponse by Tracfin”]).
165. Rapport
d’activité
2008
[Activity
report
2008],
TRACFIN
11,
https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/tracfin/Publications/rapports_acti
vite/2008_rapport_FR.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EZW-QRYV] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019);
Rapport
d’activité
2010
[Activity
report
2010],
TRACFIN
42,
https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/tracfin/Publications/rapports_acti
vite/2010_rapport_FR.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EHD-G4NU] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019);
Rapport annuel d’analyse et d’activité 2012 [Annual analysis and activity report 2012],
TRACFIN
52,
69,
https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/tracfin/Publications/RAAA_2012
_TRACFIN.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JRA-LL7K] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019); Rapport annuel
d’activité TRACFIN 2017 [Annual activity report TRACFIN 2017], TRACFIN 10,
https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/ra-2017-tracfin.pdf [https://perma.cc/HGL6-B4J6]
(last
visited Nov. 30, 2019); Rapport annuel d’activité TRACFIN 2018 [Annual activity report
TRACFIN 2018], TRACFIN 11, https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/web_RAA_tracfin2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/CH4P-CL9U] (last visited Nov. 30, 2019).
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main one is that French lawyers are focusing their efforts on upstream
prophylactic measures, i.e. early identification and understanding of
clients and transactions in order to minimize the risk that down the road
they will be faced with a decision of whether or not to report. This is
consistent with the structure of the current professional guidelines and
was quite clearly explained in prior versions, under titles such as
“dissuasion rather than denunciation.”166 It is explained that “the
advocate’s true duty . . . is to know a client before acting for it.” 167 “By
identifying clients, understanding the nature of transactions,
convincing clients not to proceed and withdrawing services if they fail
to convince, advocates are satisfying their [legal] obligations . . . .”168
A lawyer’s duty is to monitor client activities and, should suspicions
arise as to a future transaction, to dissuade them from proceeding. If a
lawyer fails to convince his client not to proceed, then he must
terminate the retainer or representation.169 This is a strategy that places
the emphasis on due diligence and risk-prevention at the moment of
client engagement and matter acceptance. Failure to achieve full clarity
with respect to both is sanctioned by the immediate duty to terminate
services. The downside is likely loss of economic opportunity, but it
can be argued that this kind of arbitrage is generally consistent with
French cultural preferences.170 A second, more technical explanation to
the low number of reports received by the FIU is the traditionally wide
definition under French law of information that is protected by
advocate secrecy, a concept that is both wide and absolute. For
example, it cannot be released by clients. This is where the bâtonnier
filter may play its most critical role.
The regime of client monies is also of interest, as it is a large
source of SARs in the British system.171 In the French system, client
monies held by advocates are placed under the control of regional
166. See generally Dissuader pour ne pas dénoncer: Conseils de vigilance & de
procédures internes destinés à prévenir l’utilisation de la profession d’avocat aux fins de
blanchiment des capitaux d’origine illicite et de financement du terrorisme [Dissuading not to
denounce: Guidance on vigilance & internal procedures to prevent the use of the profession of
advocate for the purpose of money laundering and financing of terrorism], CONSEIL NATIONAL
DES BARREAUX [NATIONAL BAR COUNCIL] (Jan. 2012), http://www.etudes-fiscalesinternationales.com/media/02/00/3729884604.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RSL-2HHS].
167. Id. at 8.
168. Id. at 8.
169. CNB Guide Pratique, supra note 157, at 24.
170. This is the view of the author as a French advocate and national.
171. See Part IV.
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organizations, called the CARPAs, which are supervised by the bar
councils.172 AML control over these funds is performed by the
CARPAs themselves which can communicate freely with advocates, in
which case the communications are covered by professional secrecy
and cannot be disclosed to the FIU.173 The FIU is authorized to send
enquiries to the CARPAs, but the CARPAs cannot respond directly and
must send their responses to the bâtonniers, who may then
communicate them to the FIU.174 The CARPAs are not under any
independent reporting obligation and are not required by law to
spontaneously report suspicions.175 Here too, the profession has
internalized its AML procedures and placed it under the central control
of the bar authorities and bâtonniers.
The views of the head of the French FIU, surely a competent
observer in such matters, seem to align with the more constructive
interpretations regarding the low number of reports. In a recent
interview he commented, somewhat wryly, that “at the end of the day,
the scope of suspicious transaction reporting is so narrow that it is
normal that there are so few—although there might possibly be
more.”176 Overall, if one compares with the British reporting figures,
there is indeed a discrepancy, which must therefore reflect the
differences between the regimes. In the particular area of real estate
transactions, however, French notary reporting activity has been
steadily increasing and is now not unlike the SAR numbers that are
reported in the field of UK conveyancing (see above).
Chart 3: Number of STR reports received from French notaries
(source: Tracfin annual reports)177

172. Règlement Intérieur National de la Profession d’Avocat (RIN) 2019 [National Rules
of Procedure of the Advocate Profession (RIN) 2019], CONSEIL NATIONAL DES BARREAUX
[NATIONAL
BAR
COUNCIL]
art.
6.2
(Sept.
12,
2019),
https://www.cnb.avocat.fr/sites/default/files/rin_2019-09-12_consolide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H7WL-89LK].
173. CNB Guide Pratique, supra note 157, at 38.
174. Id. at 39-40.
175. Id.
176. Entretien avec Bruno Dalles, directeur de Tracfin [Interview of Bruno Dalles,
Director of the French FIU Tracfin], TENDANCE DROIT (Jan. 2018),
http://www.tendancedroit.fr/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/dpn1801entretien.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8Q2B-A8L3].
177. See supra note 165.
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Year

2007

2008

2009
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2014
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2016

2017

2018

Notaries

313

347

370

674

1069

995

970

1040

996

1044

1401

1474

In summary, after almost a decade of largely unsuccessful
litigation in the country’s highest courts, the French profession is now
placed under full AML regime.178 The system of compliance that has
evolved is a centralized one with a significant element of selfregulation. The bar authorities (bâtonniers) serve as central filters
overseeing the articulation of AML obligations with traditional rules of
confidentiality and conduct. The reporting obligation, for its part, is
managed by way of emphasis on upstream prophylactic measures
before client and matter acceptance. The system is geared toward the
protection of traditional standards of conduct, and the profession is
implicitly accepting to pay the potential price in the form of reduced
activity or loss of economic opportunity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Without seeking to read too much into the comparisons that have
been drawn, it seems possible to formulate certain wider lessons,
findings, or interrogations.
First, the introduction of AML controls over lawyers and legal
professionals is primarily a function of the political will of lawmakers.
This may sound self-evident, but POCA in the United Kingdom and
the Second Directive in the European Union were forceful measures
underpinned by strong political convictions regarding the need to
reform the financial system. Where that political conviction does not
exist, mandatory AML measures on lawyers seem unlikely. This seems
relevant in the US context.
Second, the US legal profession remains an outlier that has been
successful not only in blocking AML reform directly affecting it, but
also other related policies, such as corporate transparency. Through the
178. The FATF’s latest Mutual Evaluation Report of France is quite old (2011). In this
report, FATF rated France as “partially compliant” with regard to the 2003 Recommendations
on lawyer-related CDD, record keeping and suspicious transaction reporting. Id. at 24-26. See
generally Rapport d’évaluation mutelle de la France: Lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux
et le financement du terrorisme [Mutual Evaluation Report of France: Fight against money
laundering and the financing of terrorism], FATF (Feb. 25, 2011), https://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20France%20ful.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V2QJ-RPL9].
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semantical use of the expression gatekeeper, the battle against
international AML standards has been joined with other professional
battles against the SEC and other domestic agencies. The US critique
has specifically targeted the FATF as an institution and questioned its
legitimacy. Generally, the US legal profession’s success is indicative
of its deep integration in the US political economy and its powerful
voice in domestic affairs.
Third, the European Union is clearly a frontrunner in AML
regulation. Its lawyer-related measures in the Second Directive
reflected the 2003 recommendations before they were even published
by the FATF and, it is argued, facilitated their diffusion. This has not
been the main topic of this Article, but it seems that the tight
cooperation between the FATF and EU institutions is a crucial
component of global AML norm design and implementation.179
Fourth, the European system shows that there are different ways
of rolling out transnational regulatory standards. The AML lawyerrelated provisions of the European Directives apply to all the member
states, but they allow a measure of national discretion and can be rolled
out through national implementing statutes that are closer to country
tradition. A central lever of discretion is the ability to involve
professional bar authorities in the operation of the national regimes, an
option that was exercised to maximum effect in France, but not in the
United Kingdom. This may have allowed the French profession to
retain greater control over AML regime implementation. This
versatility of national regimes and professional responses runs counter
to the US critique centering on the one-size-fits-all dimension of the
FATF standards.
Yet another comment pertains to the voice of the European
professions in the European institutional system. The French
profession, and other continental professions like in Belgium, deployed
significant effort to obtain judicial relief from some of the AML
measures in its national courts and in the two highest European courts
of Luxembourg and Strasbourg. Looking beyond the legal arguments,
it is interesting to ask oneself why these attempts were unsuccessful. Is
it possible that the European professions and the judges in Luxembourg
179. See generally Valsamis Mitsilegas & Niovi Vavoula, The Evolving EU Anti-Money
Laundering Regime: Challenges for Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law, 23 MAASTRICHT
J. EUR. & COMP. L. 261 (2016); Leonardo Borlini & Francesco Montanaro, The Evolution of the
EU Law Aagainst Criminal Finance: The “Hardening” of FATF Standard Within the EU, 48
GEO. J. INT’L L. 1009 (2017).
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or Strasbourg are too distant from one another to form a common
cultural community? At the very least, one can say that the European
legal professions have less voice in the EU institutional system than the
US legal profession in its own system.
A final comment is regarding the effectiveness of these AML
regimes. It seems entirely normal that the commercial bar should
participate in AML policy implementation and not hide behind claims
of “lawyer exceptionalism” or roles as “guardians” of the rule of law.
The lack of empirical research on the positive effects of lawyer-related
AML measures remains problematic, however, and should if possible
be remedied. It must also be acknowledged that effective AML
monitoring by lawyers can be difficult. Risk identification can be
impeded by high levels of intermediation of cross-border financial
flows and the long length of cross-border service supply chains, which
generate information asymmetries.180 In such circumstances, law firms
sometimes have limited visibility on the full activities of their overseas
clients. If not accompanied by wider structural measures such as
transnational corporate transparency reform or general increase in
government resources devoted to financial monitoring, the risk is that
delegation of AML functions to lawyers in the private sector may bear
little fruit.

180. On information asymmetry created by the use of offshore companies, see generally
Delphine Nougayrède, The Use of Offshore Companies in Emerging Market Economies: A Case
Study, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. LAW. 401 (2017); Delphine Nougayrède, After the Panama Papers:
A Private Law Critique of Shell Companies, 51 THE INT’L L. (2019).

